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Periodical article Periodical article Leiden University catalogue Leiden University catalogue WorldCat catalogue WorldCat
Title:Insider Trading Regulation in South Africa: A Public Choice Perspective
Author:Osode, Patrick C.ISNI
Year:1999
Periodical:African Journal of International and Comparative Law
Volume:11
Issue:4
Period:December
Pages:688-708
Language:English
Geographic term:South Africa
Subjects:financial policy
financial market
Economics and Trade
Law, Human Rights and Violence
External link:https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/afjincol11&id=708&collection=journals&index=journals/afjincol
Abstract:According to the public choice theory of regulation, most government intervention in the legal regulation of private activity tends to promote or protect the fortunes of the strongest of the private interest groups whose economic interests are affected by any regulatory intervention. This thesis is used to examine the past, the present and the future of insider trading regulation in South Africa and the question as to whether the prohibition of insider trading and the expenditure of public resources on enforcing it are required in order to defend a compelling public interest in the financial markets, and whether there are cohesive or influential interest groups whose interests are being served by a comprehensive insider trading ban. The current regulatory regime of insider trading in South Africa, in its design and enforcement, is not being driven by a government resolve to protect some compelling public interest. The regulatory regime now exists mainly for the benefit of, and as a result of, the efforts of readily identifiable private interest groups. The ban on insider trading is certain to remain in South Africa as long as the private interests of the market professionals and the members or employees of the relevant regulatory bodies so dictate. Notes, ref.
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